Cortland Evening Standard, Saturday, August 1, 1903.
WAR REMINISCENCES
By Captain Saxton of the 157th Regiment, N. Y. Vols.
MORE ABOUT CHANCELLORSVlLLE.
The 157th Regiment in Reserve Annoyed by Rebel Sharp Shooters—Entire Army Finally Retreats—Effort to Fix the Responsibility for the Defeat of the Union Army in this Battle.
CHAPTER 29.
To the Editor of The Standard:
Sir—I will now return to my diary and not attempt to describe the battle of Sunday, May 3, 1863. How Hooker called Pleasanton and Sickles from Hazel Grove at daylight, thereby surrendering the key to the Union position on the account of its higher ground. How Stuart at once occupied it and placed thirty pieces of artillery and shelled Slocum's Corps and the new line out of their works by their enfilading fire. How the battle raged from daylight till 11 a. m. How Hooker himself, leaning against a pillar of the Chancellor house, was stunned by a shell from Hazel Grove and for an hour the Army of the Potomac was without a head. How the woods caught fire and many a poor wounded boy was burned, being unable to get away. How Hooker was compelled to contract his line still further, fortifying the whole length, his right and left resting on the Rappahannock [river].
None of these incidents will I describe. Neither will I describe how Gen. Sedgwick on the left wing drove Early from Fredericksburg Heights and pressed on to join Hooker. How Lee detached some of his army from before Hooker and forced Sedgwick back on the river around Banks ford, reoccupying Fredericksburg himself. How Sedgwick finally recrossed the river at Banks ford and joined Hooker at United States ford and the army occupied the quarters they started from ten days before.
157th Held in Reserve.
Sunday, May 3, 1863.—The Fifth Corps came up at daylight and we, the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, marched back toward the United States ford. We lay down in the woods on the east side of a small hill. Soon after daylight the battle was resumed with all its fury. There was a continual roar of artillery and crash of musketry. We lay where we could hear the whole of it, and the suspense was awful. We were ignorant of how the battle was going, and after our severe drubbing the night before we were very apprehensive. Prisoners and wounded men kept going by. I sat down and wrote in my diary of the events of yesterday, breathing a prayer to God for victory. The woods caught fire and many a poor wounded boy who could not get away was burned to death.
Near 11 o'clock the firing ceased. We moved into some breastworks the Fifth Corps had thrown up at 4 p. m. and stayed there until 11 p. m. Then moved again and lay down in the woods till morning. The whip-poor-wills came out and sang "Whip-Poor-Will," "Whip-Poor-Will" and I thought it the most doleful sound I ever heard.
Rebel Sharp Shooters.
May 4, Monday.—At daylight we formed in line of battle and moved to the brow of the hill back of us, expecting an attack. Rebel sharp shooters annoyed us a great deal. Our men replied when they could see anything to shoot at. We discovered they were trying to plant a battery in front of us, and we cleared off the brush so our artillery could get the range. We soon drove them away. Moved half a mile to the right and were not again disturbed.
May 5, Tuesday.—Cleared off the brush in front so the sharp shooters could not creep up on is. They annoyed us continually. The bullets whistled over our heads pretty lively. An aide, riding by in front of our regiment, had his horse killed under him.
Toward night it began to rain hard and rained all night. No tents were allowed up or fires lighted and we passed the whole night in the mud leaning against a tree, sometimes sitting, sometimes standing.
Whole Army in Sight.
May 6, Wednesday.— Before daylight we were ordered to fall in and move down toward the river. As soon as it was light we saw that the whole army was in motion. It was still raining and very muddy. When we arrived at the bill overlooking the river about a mile way, I had an opportunity of seeing more soldiers than at any other time during the war, with probably one exception. Saw nearly the whole Army of the Potomac. They were moving down that hill and across the bottom land in three long columns as far back and in front as you could see. We crossed the Rappahannock at the United States ford. Saw several of the Seventy-sixth New York boys. Marched to our camp at Oak Grove where we had left our nice log houses we had never used. Stopped there and the word went round that we were to remain. We went to work fixing our tents over them for roofs and getting ready to enjoy them and at 3 p. m. were ordered to march on. We arrived at our old camp near Stafford Court House at 9 p. m., having been absent ten days.
LeRoy Cole, who still belonged to Topographical engineers, at Gen. Schimmelfennig's headquarters had gone on ahead and built a fire in the fire place of the palace [small shack built by soldiers—CC ed.].
The Palace Co. was broken up forever. My bunkie, Strobeck, and Dyer's bunkie, Courtney, were wounded and afterwards transferred to the invalid Corps. Co. C. had its proportion of the seventy-nine killed and wounded of the regiment. I have not a complete list of the casualties; but so far as I now remember they were: W. S. Cooper, Arthur H. Fox, Levi W. Loomis, Oscar Courtney. Orson Strobeck, J. P. Smith and W. W. Chapel were wounded. There were some others, but I cannot now recall them.
More About the Eleventh Corps.
I have already devoted more time to the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville than I intended; but the flood of evidence has so accumulated that I cannot refrain from shedding some more light of truth upon that battle. From the first, abuse and obloquy have been heaped upon that corps without stint or measure. Newspapers, generals, historians, all have taken a liberal hand in its abuse, until as Major Huntington says: "Truly it is easier to fight battles than to dig out lies about them, after they have become firmly imbedded in history." We may be almost ready with Sir Horace Walpole to exclaim: "Read me anything but history for I know that is false!"
Question of Responsibility.
Who was responsible for the failure of the Union army at Chancellorsville?
Gen. Hooker says: "It was the giving way of the Eleventh Corps that lost me my position." True—but what Corps of 9,000 men could have held that position? Gen. Sickles says: "The failure of the campaign was due to the giving way of the Eleventh Corps." Partially true again. But whose fault is it that that small Corps remained in that exposed position all that long Saturday "with no entrenchments worth speaking of?" Gen. Howard, the Eleventh Corps commander says: "The disaster was due to the bad conduct of the Eleventh Corps." Gen. Howard also said later to the committee on the conduct of the war: "I never did have any confidence in the Eleventh Corps."
On the third day of the battle of Gettysburg after Gen. Lee had ordered Longstreet to charge the Union lines, as Pickett came back from that charge crushed and almost annihilated, Gen. Lee said: "It was all my fault, it was my mistake." Whoever heard the commander of the Eleventh Corps, either in speech or voluminous writings, admit that he ever made a military mistake much less at the battle of Chancellorsville?
New Light Throw In.
I will now give some facts that have come to light within the last thirty years and upon thorough examination both by Col. Hamlin, the Eleventh Corps historian, by the editor of the Acme Haversack, and others, are proven to be absolutely true without the shadow of a doubt. The reader may accept each statement as the verity of truth itself.
I will give these quotations without comment and each reader can form his own conclusions as to where the blame for the failure of the Union army ought to rest.
In the afternoon of May 1, the day before the battle, Gen. Sickles, under Gen. Hooker's orders sent Gen. Graham's brigade of Birney's division of the Third Corps to reinforce the Eleventh Corps. Howard met Graham half way from the Chancellor house and Dowdall's. "Where are you going?" asked Howard. "To Dowdall's Tavern." "Perhaps you mean Todd's Tavern." "No! Dowdall's." "This cannot be, there must be some mistake about this, my (Howard's) headquarters are there." "I don't know anything about that," replied Graham "Such are my orders." "That cannot be," replied Howard, "I would send my compliments to the whole rebel army, and invite them to attack me in my present position, and if it were not out of compliment to Gen. Sickles I would order you back."
Col. Carmichael's Testimony.
Our colonel, then major, James C. Carmichael stated in writing in June that he and Col. Lackman went on picket the night before the attack, heard Jackson's preparation and went to Corps headquarters and gave information and received the reply, "You are new troops and more frightened than hurt."
Col. Lee of the Fifty-fifth Ohio, later lieutenant governor of Ohio, of McLean's Brigade of Devans' division on the right says: As early as 10 a. m. we could see troops on a high point to the south east moving. I went at once to the Hatch House (Talleys') where McLean and Devans both had their headquarters, and reported to McLean, my superior officer."
McLean said that the supposition was that Lee's army was in retreat. I found old man Hatch and showed him the troops moving and told him he must inform us on what road they were moving and its connections. At first he could see no troops, but I told him I knew he could and that he must tell truthfully on what road. At first he refused, but when I told him his person and property were in our hands and that he had got to do it, be consented and I found a spot in the door yard free from grass and marked out a diagram of the roads and their connections and I found that they led to our right. I showed this diagram to McLean and he reported it to Devans and Devans to Howard.
Officers Incredulous.
Col. Lee says further his officer of the picket sent him a messenger at 1, another at 2, another at 3 p. m. that the enemy was moving with infantry and artillery across his flank. He went with the messenger to McLean and Devans (both in the same house) and gave them the information. Devans did not believe it and said: "If anything of this kind was going on I would be informed from Corps headquarters." Devans said to Col. Lee: "It is not worthwhile to be scared before you are hurt."
The officer of the day of Devans' division reported to him that a large force of the enemy was in his rear, but Devans did not believe it.
In the afternoon Capt. Dilger, commanding Battery 1, First Ohio, (our brigade battery) under Gen. Schurz' orders accompanied by an orderly, rode up the pike and found Von Gilsa very much disturbed who urged him not to go beyond the lines, but he passed on to Lucket's farm a mile from Von Gilsa and ran right into the rebel army and was cut off from retreat. He was pursued by the rebel cavalry, narrowly escaping capture. He finally found a road to the north into the United States ford road and late in the afternoon arrived at Hooker's headquarters and reported what he had seen. He was advised to go to his own Corps and tell his yarn there. He rode rapidly to Howard's headquarters and reported, but they would not believe it, and he was given to understand that he had no business out on the flank scouting. He was positively told that Lee was retreating and that Barlow's brigade with Gen. Howard had gone south to fall on the enemy.
Our brigade commander, Gen. Shimmelfennig, sent out Maj. Schleiter of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania to reconnoitre. He soon returned with the information that he had found the enemy in great force and heard the Confederate officers giving commands. Major Schłeiter reported the same at Corps headquarters and was laughed at.
Some cavalry went out on the pike late in the afternoon and reported to Gen. Devans that he could go but a little way as he met a large body of infantry, Gen. Devans replied impatiently: "I wish I could get some one who could make a reconnaissance for me." The captain replied: "General, I can go further, but I cannot promise to return." W. S.








