Cortland Evening Standard, Tuesday,
March 20, 1900.
JUDGE SEWELL'S CHARGE
TO THE JURY IN THE
JOHN TRUCK MURDER TRIAL.
The Law Carefully
Explained—Different Degrees Of Murder and Manslaughter Set Forth—Rules of
Circumstantial Evidence—A Reasonable Doubt Explained—Duty of the Jury Made
Plain.
Judge Albert H. Sewell on Friday afternoon,
March 16, charged the jury as follows in the Truck murder trial:
Gentlemen of the jury:
You have been chosen from a large number of
the citizens of your county as the twelve men satisfactory to the people and
the defendant to determine the question at issue between them. No more grave
and important question could be submitted to you, for upon its decision depends
the life or death of the defendant. The determination of this question is a
duty you would be willing to be relieved from and it is one that many, to their
discredit be said, have evaded. Yet recognizing your duty to society to the members
of the community in which you live and to yourselves, you accepted the
responsibility, and by your patient and earnest attention to the evidence you
have shown that you intend to discharge that duty intelligently and conscientiously.
The defendant is charged in the indictment with
the crime of murder in the first degree. It is claimed by the people that on
the 14th day of March last, the defendant, John Truck, killed Frank W. Miller
from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect death. The defendant by his
plea of not guilty put in issue all the facts alleged in the indictment and
rendered it necessary for the people to prove 1st the death of Frank W. Miller,
2d the killing by the defendant as charged in the indictment.
Under a provision of the Penal Code the
death of the person alleged to have been killed must appear as an independent
fact and by direct and positive proof. So there can be no conviction of the
crime of murder or manslaughter in this case unless the fact of death appears
by direct proof. This rule does not require direct proof that the body found in
the burning building was that of Frank W. Miller, the person alleged to have
been killed; that fact may be shown by any evidence that satisfies you beyond a
reasonable doubt. The rule requires the body of the crime, viz., the fact that
a human being is dead, and the existence of some human agency as the cause of death
to be established by unequivocal and certain proof; and when these facts are so
proved the remaining inquiries, who is the slain and who was the slayer, may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence in a criminal
case is the proof of facts and circumstances connected with or surrounding the
commission of the crime as tends to show the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Direct proof is that which is produced by direct evidence of the fact required
to be proved.
The finding of a dead body with the skull
crushed and broken or partially consumed by fire under circumstances which
exclude accident or self destruction and the finding of articles belonging to
the deceased in the possession of the accused is an example of direct proof, and
such as is required by this statute to prove the vital fact of death.
The first question for you to determine is,
have the people by direct proof established the fact of death by violence; are
you positive that the man whose body was found in the burning building was
murdered? Upon this question you have the evidence of the people that Frank W.
Miller was last seen about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th day of March,
1899, going in the direction of his home; that about 11 o'clock that night, his
house was discovered to be on fire and the body of a man partly consumed was
found therein. Fragments of clothing identified as belonging to and worn by
Frank W. Miller were found upon the body and a foot having a peculiar mark and
a broken tooth were also directly identified. The evidence also tends to show
that in the stomach of the body
was found partially digested food of the same kind as that eaten by Frank W.
Miller a short time before, and in the possession of the defendant were found
the next day numerous articles of personal property belonging to Miller. From the
evidence, from the condition of the body, the injuries inflicted upon it, from
the two letters introduced in evidence (if you find he wrote them) and from
such other evidence as you may recall bearing upon this question, you are to
determine if Frank W. Miller is dead, and whether the body found was his. If
you do not so find it will be unnecessary for you to consider any other
question, and you will render a verdict of not guilty. If you do so find, if
you are convinced that Frank W. Miller is dead, you will then proceed to
consider whether he was killed by the defendant and if the defendant is guilty
of the crime of murder as charged in the indictment.
Murder in the first degree so far as it is
applicable to this case in defined to be "the killing of a human being
unless it is excusable or justifiable when committed from a deliberate and
premeditated design to affect the death of the person killed by another."
You will remember, gentlemen, that it is not enough to find that one man killed
another with a design to effect death. It must also appear from evidence that
the killing was done with premeditation and deliberation. A man premeditates
and deliberates when he thinks, when he resolves in his mind beforehand, when
he weighs facts with a view to a choice and considers the chances and
consequences. There is no arbitrary limit upon this time; deliberation and
premeditation may exist a long time, or it may be the matter of seconds, but
there must be time enough to reflect and choose. If there is sufficient time to
form a design to take life and to put this design into execution, there is deliberation
and premeditation. If you find that the defendant killed Frank W. Miller; that
he intended to kill him; that he reflected and decided to kill, he is guilty of
the crime of murder in the first degree, if he is accountable for the act.
If you find that there was no premeditation
or deliberation; that no choice was made by the defendant, but that there was
an intention to kill and that he did kill the deceased, he is guilty of murder
in the second degree.
If you find that there was no intention to
kill, you may then consider the question of manslaughter. Manslaughter in the
first degree is the killing of another when committed without design to effect
death, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means
of a dangerous weapon. Manslaughter in the second degree is the killing of a
human being without design to effect death, in the heat of passion, but not by
a dangerous weapon or by the use of means cruel or unusual.
Now, gentlemen, to make more plain and to
fix these definitions in your minds I will say that the killing of a human
being with an intent to kill, is murder; if without an intent, it is
manslaughter. If in addition to an intent to kill there is premeditation and
deliberation, the crime is murder in the first degree. If there was no
premeditation or deliberation, and yet there was a design to kill, it is murder
in the second degree.
You have the right under the law to find the
defendant guilty, not only of the crime charged in the indictment, but of any
lesser degree of the same crime. Under this indictment the defendant may be
found guilty of murder in the first or second degree, or of manslaughter in the
first or second degree, if you find that the evidence will justify or warrant
the conclusion. If there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two degrees the
defendant is guilty, you should find him guilty of the lower.
The people claim that the evidence in this
case shows that the defendant killed Frank W. Miller; that be intended to kill
him; and that the act was a deliberate and premeditated one.
I can give you no rule as to the character
or the amount of evidence necessary to prove the commission of the act, or the
existence of a deliberate and premeditated design. Every case must depend upon
its own facts and circumstances. The evidence which satisfies you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act, and had his mind [went]
through the process of deliberation and premeditation and formed the design or
intention is sufficient. The question for you to determine is did the defendant
go to Miller's house with the resolution in his mind to kill him; did he form
that resolution and kill him pursuant to that resolve. If you are so convinced beyond
reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. If he
did not have that resolution; if the intent was formed instantaneously and
accompanied the act of killing, he is guilty of murder in the second degree, if
he is responsible.
There is no direct evidence of the
defendant's guilt. The person who committed the act is the only person other
than the deceased who was present when the crime was committed, and the people
are obliged to rely upon circumstantial evidence to establish the facts. If the
facts and circumstances proven by the people are sufficient to satisfy you
beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, then the evidence is
sufficient to authorize you to find a verdict of guilty. When a conviction for
a crime is sought upon circumstantial evidence alone the people must show not
only that the facts are true, but that each link in the chain of circumstance
is in harmony with the guilt of the accused and the circumstances must be of
such a character that they cannot be true in the ordinary course of nature and
the defendant innocent. There should be the same degree of certainty from
circumstantial evidence as that which arises from direct evidence; that is, it
must be sufficient to exclude every reasonable doubt.
By a reasonable doubt is meant one that is
reasonable, one that a reasonable man would entertain in view of all the
evidence in the case. It is a doubt that has a reason for its base. It differs
from a guess or an imaginary unsubstantial doubt. It is a doubt that an honest,
conscientious, painstaking man would entertain upon the same state of fact. If
after looking into all the evidence you can say that you have a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt, you will render a verdict of not guilty.
I shall not attempt to review the evidence
that the people claim establishes the crime. Upon this branch of the case you
have on the one side the evidence produced by the people, and on the other the
presumption of innocence, as the defendant has not been sworn. The law permits
the defendant to testify in his own behalf, but his neglect to do so does not
create any presumption against him. It is insisted on the part of the people
that the evidence shows that this defendant went to the house of the deceased
and killed him in pursuance of a resolution wholly and completely formed
several days before he committed the act, and that Miller was killed by
violence appeared from the condition of the body, by the break in the skull and
by the fact that the defendant had in his possession numerous articles of
personal property belonging to the deceased immediately after the crime was
committed. And it is claimed that it also appears from the letters introduced
in evidence and from other facts that have been fully discussed by the counsel
for the people. It is for you to say whether you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt from this evidence that the defendant killed the deceased. If
you do not so find, it will not be necessary to consider the other defense upon
which the defendant relies. If you find that the defendant killed Frank W.
Miller you will then determine if the defendant was at that time responsible in
law and therefore in the eyes of the law guilty.
It is claimed as the part of the defendant
[defense] that at the time of the alleged homicide he was insane and therefore
not responsible for any act he may have committed. Section 20 of the Penal Code
provides that "An act done by a person who is an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or
insane, is not a crime." Section 21 provides that "A person is not
excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or insane
person, except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal
act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or not to know that the act was wrong.
If you find that the defendant committed the
act charged in the indictment, but if you also find that the defendant's mind
was so diseased or affected, that he did not know the nature or quality of the act; did not know the character, kind or
extent of the act he was doing, he is irresponsible, and not guilty. If he knew
the nature and character of the act, but if his mind was in such a condition
that he did not know that it was wrong, then he is irresponsible in the eyes of
the law and not guilty.
A person is presumed to be responsible for
his acts, and the burden of proving that is irresponsible, is upon the accused person,
but when any evidence has been given by the defendant tending to show insanity
or irresponsibility, then the people* are bound to establish his sanity, or
that his mind was in such a condition that he knew the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, and that it was wrong. When any evidence is given by the
defendant upon this question, the burden of proof shifts to the people to this
extent, that if there is on the whole proof [of] a reasonable doubt of
insanity, the accused must be given the benefit of that doubt and acquitted. A
person may be subject to illusions, he may be insane upon certain subjects, and
still know the character and extent of the act of which he is accused, and may
know the difference between right and wrong as relates to that act. Such a
person may be deemed medically insane, still in the eyes of the law, he is
legally sane and responsible. There is a distinction between medical insanity,
and legal insanity; that is, between what medical men call insanity, and legal
irresponsibility. No matter how insane a person may be, if he knew the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, and that it was wrong, he is responsible for his acts and is legally
sane.
It matters not what the condition of the
defendant is, or has been, except so far as the facts go to show, whether he
had the power of judging as to the nature and quality of the act, or its
consequences. An insane delusion is an unreasonable belief in the existence of
facts impossible or contrary to human experience and known natural laws. An
insane delusion which controls the will and judgment and induces a man to
believe an act to be other than it is so as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong in respect to the act is an [excuse] for
crime.
The question of insane delusions is also important
as throwing light upon the question of the knowledge or capacity of the party
to know right from wrong, and when the delusion is such that he does not know
the nature or the consequences of the act he is irresponsible. The fact that a
person has an insane delusion upon one subject, does not affect his responsibility
for a crime, with reference to some other matter not connected with that particular
delusion. If he is capable, notwithstanding the delusion, of distinguishing between
right and wrong as applied to the criminal act, and of knowing the legal and moral
character of the act he is doing, he is not excused from criminal liability.
Partial insanity will excuse crime only when
it breaks down the power to distinguish between right and wrong. If by partial
insanity he was deprived of his reason in respect to the act; if it took from
him the freedom of moral action he is not responsible.
Upon this question a great amount of
evidence has been given by each party. The evidence of the
witnesses called in behalf of the defendant lends to show that he was injured
when a boy and that his acts at times thereafter and previous to the alleged
homicide were of an irrational character. Various circumstances have been
testified to which the defendant claims indicates that at times he was laboring
under a defect of reason.
On the other hand evidence has been given by
witnesses for the people, tending to show that [no] defect of reason existed at
the time of the tragedy, and that the defendant was responsible for his acts.
There is a sharp conflict of evidence, in regard to the mental capacity of the
defendant; not only among the lay witnesses, but between men learned in the
science of medicine, who have made special study of the question of insanity,
and have a technical knowledge of its causes and indications. On both sides the
experts have expressed their opinions as to the sanity or insanity of the
defendant at the time of the homicide. Those called by the people have answered
hypothetical questions in which facts deemed to have been proven on the part of
the people were assumed, and they have given their opinion, assuming those
facts to be true, that the defendant was sane at the time the alleged crime was
committed; that he knew the nature and quality of the act; and that it was
wrong. The medical experts called in behalf of the defendant, have also been
asked hypothetical questions, and they have given their opinion that he was
insane and not legally responsible. They have also testified to personal
examination of the defendant and from the facts observed by them, the experts
called by the defendant [defense] have testified that in their opinion the
defendant was for some time before and at the time of the commission of the
alleged criminal act laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature
or quality of the act and that he was legally insane. And those called by the
people have testified that in their opinion he was sane and responsible. It is
proper in examining this evidence, to give the opinions of these witnesses the
consideration you think it entitled to, taking into consideration their
ability, their integrity and intelligence. When an expert testifies to a
scientific fact, his evidence is entitled to consideration, but the value of
his opinion, based upon assumed facts, depends whether these facts are proven
to your satisfaction. If the hypothetical question did not give or state the
facts respecting the defendant's life and habits; if it did not give truthful
color and semblance to his conduct and condition, it is not entitled to much
consideration in arriving at a judgment.
You will give to these facts, to the opinion
of these experts and to all the evidence bearing upon the mental condition of
the defendant, the weight you think it entitled to; every word, every act, his
appearance and actions, before and subsequent to the commission of the alleged
crime, consider with care, that you may determine whether the defendant spoke
the word, or did the act, knowing and realizing what he did, and as bearing
upon the question, whether he knew and realized that it was wrong. What he did
and what he said before and after the tragedy, his conduct and his statements,
oral and written are competent upon this question. This evidence deserves and
demands your most careful consideration, and after that you will determine
whether the defendant has sufficient capacity to know the character of the act
with which he is charged and that it was wrong. If you have a reasonable doubt
of his ability to do this, you will render a verdict of not guilty.
If you find that the defendant killed Frank
W. Miller, from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect death, that at
that time he knew the nature and character of the act he was doing, that it was
wrong and forbidden by the laws of God and man, you will render a verdict
"guilty of murder in the first degree" as charged in the indictment.
If you find that the defendant was responsible, and not insane; that he killed
Frank W. Miller intending to kill him, but without premeditation and deliberation,
and you are satisfied of these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, you will render
a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree; and if you find that he did
not intend to kill, but did kill Miller, in the heat of passion, by means of a
dangerous weapon, you will find him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree,
or you may find him guilty of manslaughter in the second degree, if you find
the facts justifying that conclusion.
To repeat, if you are satisfied from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant John Truck killed Frank
W. Miller, that he was at the time legally responsible, then you must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the crime
of murder in the first or second degree, or of manslaughter in the first or
second degree. If you acquit the defendant on the ground of insanity you must
state that fact with your verdict.
In disposing of this case you must consider carefully
and deliberately all the evidence. You must remember that, however much you may
sympathize, that law and order must be maintained. You must not be governed or
affected in your deliberations or conclusions by any prejudice against the
defendant. You must take the cold facts as they have been presented, and
determine the questions submitted to you uninfluenced by the consequences. I
have not attempted to review the evidence in this case. That and the facts
claimed to have been established by it have been very thoroughly discussed and
fairly presented by the counsel for the people and the counsel for the
defendant. It is my duty to give you the law which shall guide you in
determining the facts and it is your duty to determine them under the rules I have
given you. That is your responsibility. As I said in the outset no harder duty
can devolve upon a trial jury than to render a verdict that will determine
whether a man shall live or die. We have each assumed grave duties. They came
to us without choice, and necessity demands that they shall be met and
conscientiously performed.
Now, gentlemen, take this case, give it your
calm, sound, dispassionate and conscientious consideration. Give the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt and if you are then satisfied that the
defendant [is] guilty of murder in the first degree it will be your duty to so
find and render that verdict. If on the contrary you have a reasonable doubt
that the defendant killed Frank W. Miller or that he was responsible for that
act within the rules I have given you, it will be your duty and privilege to
render a verdict of not guilty.
TOMPKINS COUNTY
MURDER.
Mrs. Heggie Tried
in Cortland and Convicted in 1866.
The statement was a few days ago made in
these columns in connection with the notice of the conviction of John Truck that that was the third
conviction in Cortland county of murder in the first degree. That is true so
far as a Cortland county case is concerned, but Miss Alice Haynes calls our
attention to the fact that during the administration of her father, Mr. N. H.
Haynes as sheriff of this county, Mrs. Elizabeth Heggie, a Tompkins county
prisoner, was by a change of venue after several trials in her own county
brought here and tried on the charge of poisoning five people, and was
convicted of' murder in the first degree.
A search of the court records discloses the
fact. The trial began on June 19, 1866, before Hon.
Charles Mason, the supreme court justice presiding; County Judge Hiram Crandall,
and Justices of Sessions Daniel S. Maycumber and Austin L. Pomeroy. The prosecution was
conducted by S. H. Wilcox, the district attorney of Tompkins county; while the
prisoner was defended by Hon. Lyman Tremain and by the state attorney general
Hon. John H. Martindale.
The jury consisted of Calvin Eaton, Henry
Kennedy, Artemas Reed, Alfred Greene, Joseph
Kinney, Zebedee P. Cornell, Manassah Sort, Jr., Salmon Clark, Charles H.
Gillet, John B. Webster, John W. Freeman and Calvin J. Bliss. The trial lasted
a number of days and finally the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree.
Court then recessed till Aug. 28, 1866, when
the prisoner was sentenced to be taken back to the Tompkins county jail and
there on Oct. 19, 1866, be hanged by the neck till dead.
That sentence was never carried out as after
sentence the prisoner confessed the guilt, told all the circumstances connected
with it, and in consequence her sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life.
Whether she is yet living is not known here, but some of the jury are still
living.
The court records show that the treasurer of
Tompkins county was directed to draw an order on his county for $23, in favor
of Sheriff Haynes for board of jurors; and for $123 in favor of D. J. Sperry
for board of witnesses and jurors. Many of the witnesses claimed that they were
too poor to come here to testify and orders on the county to the amount of $609
in favor of some twenty different witnesses are entered in the court records.
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