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| Emilio Aguinaldo. |
Cortland Evening Standard, Saturday, March 7, 1903.
AGUINALDO CORRESPONDENCE.
Proof That an Attack Upon Americans in Manila Was Planned.
Washington, March 7.—The bureau of insular affairs, war department, has just published a pamphlet of 48 pages giving the telegraphic correspondence of Emilio Aguinaldo from July 15, 1898, to February 28, 1899, the period just preceding the fall of Manila and following the outbreak of hostilities between the United States forces and the insurgents.
These telegrams were discovered by Captain John R. M. Taylor, 14th infantry, among the mass of papers captured from the so-called insurgent government.
They are sufficiently complete to show that the insurgent leader leaned strongly upon others for advice and counsel, that there was serious opposition to his authority even among his own people, that an attack upon the Americans at Manila had been fully decided upon before the outbreak of hostilities on February 4, 1899, and that in the event that the struggle should prove successful the new government that would have been created would not have been a republic, for titles of nobility were on January 14, 1899, promised to certain insurgent officers as a reward for entering Manila and capturing the American forces and their officers.
Insurgents Near Caracas.
Willemstad, Island of Curacao, March 7.—Advices received here from revolutionary sources in Venezuela say the revolutionists have gathered their forces around Caracas; that all the eastern part of Venezuela, except the city of Cumana, is held by them and that President Castro has been unable to call a session of congress because of the lack of a quorum.
Decrease in Number of New Cases.
Ithaca, March 7.—There is now a marked decrease in the number of new typhoid fever cases in Ithaca and the general situation is very much improved. Physicians agree that the chief danger at present lies in secondary infection. Miss Julia McClune, a junior in Cornell, was discharged from Cornell infirmary. Hers was the second case of typhoid fever to be discharged cured.
Pensioning of Professors.
Ithaca, March 7.—Announceanent was made of a scheme for the pensioning of Cornell university professors who, in accordance with the rule adopted by the board of trustees last fall, will be retired after attaining the age of 70 years. The sum of $150,000 has been given the university for this purpose and this amount will be placed at compound interest until 1914, when it will amount to $250,000. Each professor retired will receive an annual pension of $1,500, three-fourths of which will be paid from the pension fund and one-fourth of which will be contributed by the professors. It is expected, however, that professors who reach the age limit before 1914 will also receive the benefits of the pension scheme.
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| Guest editorials. |
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| Sultan Abdul Hamid II. |
PAGE FOUR—EDITORIAL.
Macedonia and the Powers.
The acceptance by Turkey of the scheme of administrative reforms for Macedonia urged by Russia and Austria does not necessarily mean that the trouble in the Balkans is over. Under pressure the Turk will promise anything and then await his own pleasure and convenience to fulfill his pledge. The time of fulfillment only comes when renewed and stronger pressure is put upon him.
The essential reforms which the Sultan has rather unexpectedly consented to make in Macedonia are, briefly, that the control of the gendarmerie, or domestic military force, shall be taken from the Turk and entrusted to the neutral nations—Belgians, Dutchmen and Swiss—and that the local needs of the Macedonian communities shall be met before any part of their revenue is sent to Constantinople. This is the least that the powers could have reasonably demanded. However, the first clause in the requirement is no doubt deeply resented at the Turkish army headquarters, while the latter clause must be viewed with equal disgust by the officials of the Turkish treasury. If the Turk can neither command nor rob a Christian community what, in Mussulman logic, is the value of such a community to the Ottoman empire? So it may be inferred that the Turk will make even this "irreducible minimum" of reform only in the extreme emergency of "saving his face"—the retention of suzerainty in the Balkans.
If the administrative reforms are carried out in good faith, the Turk will "save his face" and be permitted to retain for some time such sovereignty in southwestern Europe as he now holds. But the Turk does nothing in good faith. He will doubtless, according to his nature and past practices, try to defeat the object of the reforms by disregarding their terms as far as he can, which means as far as he dares. The sultan's promise, therefore, by no means settles the Macedonian problem.
History and experience teach that no Christian population subjected to Turkish misrule can ever be brought into a satisfactory condition until they have been emancipated from that misrule altogether, and any compromise between the powers and the porte short of the expulsion of the Turk from Europe can only be a temporary and ineffective makeshift. Whether the Macedonians are quite competent to rule themselves may be questioned, though there can be no doubt that for their well being and the peace of Europe it would be far wiser to extend to Macedonia the same autonomy as that enjoyed by the other Balkan states which have been carved out of the Ottoman empire than to leave the distracted country longer under Turkish misrule and oppression.
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| Capt. William Saxton. |
WAR REMINISCENCES.
By Captain Saxton of the 157th Regiment, N. Y. Vols.
GEN. MCCLELLAN'S SHORT COMINGS.
Constantly Overestimating the Enemy's Strength and Calling for More Troops—Opportunities to Take Richmond Pass by—Battles of Gaines Mill, Savage Station, Malvern Hill and Antietam—McClellan Relieved of Command.
CHAPTER 8.
To the Editor of The Standard:
Sir—From June 2 to June 25, Gen. McClellan was occupied in building bridges across the Chickahominy and throwing up entrenchments along his whole line.
He telegraphed the president that he was compelled to do this on account of his inferior numbers. His adjutant general reported on this date that he had present for duty 115,102 men and 41,736 absent on special duty, sick, under arrest, etc., making a total of 156,838.
The president had sent him reinforcements from around Washington, immediately after the battle, to replace his loss. Gen. Lee used this delay to concentrate his army. Stonewall Jackson with his force was recalled from the Shenandoah valley. Other troops were ordered from the South and elsewhere, until he had nearly 70,000 men, in and near Richmond.
President Lincoln consolidated the forces under Generals French, Banks and McDowell into one army and called Gen. Pope from the Mississippi to command it. On the 25th Gen. McClellan advanced Hooker's division a mile in front, and a stiff fight occurred, Hooker losing nearly 500 men. This was the battle of Oak Grove, the first of the seven days battles.
Gen. McClellan telegraphed the president "The rebel force in my front is stated to be 200,000."
Attacked at Mechanicsville.
The 26th, Jackson appeared in force at Hanover courthouse, on McClellan's right flank, threatening his rear and communications. Rebel Gen. Hill attacked our forces at Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy. A stubborn fight ensued, but Hill failed to drive our forces back.
At this time eight divisions of the Union army were on the right, or south bank of the river, occupying entrenchments; the balance of the army, was still on the north side, really two separate armies.
McClellan was in a bad position. If he withdrew to the north bank it would indicate that he had abandoned the attempt to capture Richmond. If he moved to the south bank it would leave the way open for the Confederates to capture his supply depot at White House.
He decided to change his base of supplies to the James river, distant about 20 miles, with only one wagon road across White Oak swamp, leading to it.
During the night of the 26th, after Hill had been checked at Mechanicsville, McClellan ordered all of the baggage train across to the south bank, and started it over this one road for the James.
Battle of Gaines Mill.
Before daylight Friday, June 27, McCall, on our extreme right, was ordered to retreat to Gaines Mill, but the enemy attacked him with such force that he was driven down on to Porter's corps and they secured the bridge at Mechanicsville. When the enemy struck Porter's corps they were hurled back shattered and bleeding. Our forces met them with a solid front and maintained the unequal contest till nearly night, when the men, exhausted, many of them having fired nearly their last cartridge, began to fall back. McClellan took as many men from the entrenchments on the south side as he dared, sent them across, and the Confederate advance was checked. Night ended the battle at Gaines Mill.
That night our train of 5,000 wagons, 2,500 head of cattle, and other supplies, were set in motion for the James river. Our forces on the north of the Chickahominy crossed over to the south side and destroyed the bridges. The dead and wounded were abandoned.
On the 28th, Saturday, the Confederates marched to White House, and were disappointed to find that most of our stores had been removed or destroyed.
Most of the Confederate army was now on the north side and McClelland's re-united on the south, with the bridges destroyed.
McClellan's "Flank Movement."
This date McClellan telegraphed the president: "Had I 10,000 fresh troops, I could take Richmond tomorrow. I have lost this battle, because my force was too small. If I save the army now, I tell you plainly, I owe no thanks to you, or any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." The truth is he had not used half the troops he had. There were not 25,000 men between him and Richmond now. Did he strike with his 100,000 and capture the city? No. He decided to make what he called a "flank movement" across the White Oak swamp to the James river; a shorter word is "retreat."
Savage Station.
Sunday the 29th the retreat commenced, Generals Sumner's and Franklin's corps forming the rear guard. At 2 p. m. they were furiously attacked by the enemy at Savage Station, the conflict was kept up till dark. During the night Sumner and Franklin fell back to White Oak bridge and crossed over with the rest of the army.
On the 30th a battle was fought between Heintzelman's corps and the enemy, who attempted to cutoff the retreat at Charles City cross roads. The rebels were so badly defeated they lost heart and almost a panic ensued. Jackson was ordered to cover their retreat in case the Union forces advanced, and word was sent to Richmond to get all public property ready to move. During the night the Confederates were rallied by Gen. Hill and their lines reformed. Our forces fell back to a very strong position at Malvern Hill.
Malvern Hill
The next day, July 1, our line of battle was arranged, and about 4 p. m. the rebels came on to storm the position. It was an awful battle and the confederates were defeated. Our gun boats on the river united with the army in shelling the enemy, whose loss was immense.
That evening they returned in disorder to Richmond. Gen. McClellan was on the battlefield until about 6 p. m. He was down on board one of the gunboats on the river. Had he made a vigorous advance even then, no doubt Richmond could have been taken. Instead of that he continued his retreat that night to Harrison's landing on the James, leaving our dead unburied and many of the wounded to fall into the bands of the enemy.
On the 3d he telegraphed to the secretary of war "that he had not 50,000 men left, and to capture Richmond he would have to have 100,000 more men." His adjutant general reported on the 20th that he had 101,601 present for duty and 56,023 absent, sick, on special duty, etc.
If any one will read the correspondence that passed between President Lincoln, the secretary of war, and Gen, McClellan it will make his blood boil with indignation.
McClellan Dilly-Dallies.
Early in July Gen. Halleck was called from the West to Washington, as general-in-chief. It was decided to unite McClellan's army with the army around Washington, under Gen. Pope. I cannot stop to tell you of the dilly-dallying and delay of McClellan in moving. It is history and you can read it.
As soon as the Confederates were satisfied that McClellan would not advance on Richmond, they began to plan to throw their army on Gen. Pope, crush him, and perhaps capture Washington and Baltimore. The movement was begun on the 1st of August, which resulted in the defeat of Pope in the battles around Manassas, or second Bull Run, Aug. 27 to Sept. 1.
On the 3rd of August, on learning of this Confederate movement, McClellan was ordered to transfer his army to Acquia creek and unite with Pope, but in spite of positive orders, and the urgency of the case, he did not begin to move for eleven days, and his first corps did not go aboard the transports till the 21st. Himself and staff reported at Acquia Creek the 24th. A few of McClellan's troops joined Pope, the rest didn't get there. No wonder Pope was defeated. After this defeat, seeing that McClellan would not cooperate with him, Pope resigned and McClellan was again given command of all the troops around Washington.
Bloody Battle of Antietam.
The Confederates pushed on up into Maryland and on the 17th of September McClellan fought them at Antietam, "the bloodiest battle of the war." On that day more men were killed than in any other one day's battle of the rebellion. There were greater battles, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, Spotsylvania, Stone River, Chickamauga and Atlanta, but these battles lasted more than one day.
At Antietam the fight commenced at sunrise and by 4 o'clock it was over.
Lee retreated across the Potomac, and McClellan sat down on the north side and called for more troops. He finally crossed over the 26th of October and on the 7th of November he was relieved from command.
McClellan's Shortcomings.
In reviewing McClellan's military career, we are forced to conclude, that he developed an abnormal faculty of overestimating the force of the enemy and underestimating his own. He also proved his incapacity to handle large numbers of men in battle. In all of his engagements on the peninsula and at Antietam, only part of his available force was used. He seemed to have no general plan of battle. His corps commanders, for the most part, fought singly, while he was in the rear or elsewhere, superintending what should have been done by his quartermaster general. He failed to seize his opportunities, where success seemed almost certain. He failed to realize that "There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune." Nevertheless, he was very popular with his private soldiers, who were ever ready to shout for "Little Mack."
W. S.
The Voyage Was Rough.
A letter has been received from Mr. N. E. H. Gillette who with Mrs. Gillette and Miss Editha Stephens of Cortland last week took the trip by water from New York to Jacksonville, Fla. Mr. Gillette writes that the voyage was a very rough one and that one morning of the 260 passengers on board only six appeared for breakfast. He does not say whether he was one of the six, but he does say that Miss Stephens had quite decided that when it was time to return she would either walk or come by trolley rather than venture on shipboard. Her friends here are confident that she will think better of this decision after being on land for a little time.
BREVITIES.
—Wild geese going north, robins and blue-birds reported—all these are evidences of spring.
—Dryden has organized a camp of the Order of the Golden Seal with sixty-five charter members.
—The Cortland County Ministerial association will meet in the Congregational church Monday at 10:30 and at 2 p. m.
—Dr. N. L. Andres of Colgate university, Hamilton, sails from New York Tuesday, March 10, on a trip to Palestine.
—The new display advertisements today are— R. W. Mitchell, Meats, page 5; Haight & Freese Co., Stocks, bonds, etc., page 7.
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